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Introduction
This paper presents a broad technical descrip-
tion of the changes made to the Titan II ICBM to
enable it to perform the Gemini mission. In ef-
fect these changes created an essentially new
product, the Gemini Launch Vehicle.
The. data presented in this paper has been col =
lected from numerous program documents.
Program Objective
The purpose of this program is to develop
launch vehicles which will place the Gemini Space-
craft in trajectories designed to meet the follow-
ing operational objectives:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Perform a 14-day earth orbital flight.
Demonstrate that the spacecraft can
rendezvous and dock with a target vehicle
in orbit.
Develop simplified spacecraft and launch
vehicle countdown techniques in order to
optimize the rendezvous mission.
Develop a fully reliable man-rated launch
vehicle system.
Mission and Performance
Mission
The objective of the basic launch vehicle is to in-
ject the spacecraft into orbit at an altitude of 87
nautical miles with sufficient overspeed to maintain
a perigee of 87 nautical miles and an apogee of 161
nautical miles.
The general trajectory mechanization for the
Gemini Launch Vehicle is similar to that used on the
basic Titan ICBM, except for inclusion of a variable
launch azimuth capability which has been added to
meet the conditions imposed by the rendezvous mis-
s ions.
Sequentially, the Gemil,i launch is characterized
by an engine start signal, followed by a 1.08-second
span in which engine thrust is built up to 77To. At
that point, the Thrust Chamber Pressure Switch
(TCPS) activates a two-second timer and, at the end
of that period, the launch bolts are blown and liftoff
begins. Then follows a vertical rise of approxi-
mately 20 seconds. During the vertical rise, the
roll program is inserted to obtain the desired
launch azimuth. The first of three open loop pitch
commands is initiated approximately 20 seconds
after liftoff in order to approach a zero lifttra-
jectory during the Stage I flight regime. Figures
1 and 2 show the results of this type of trajectory
on a few of the basic nominal design parameters.
As in Titan il, a fire-in-the-hole technique is used
to separate the first and second stages.
Sustainer flight is guided by a closed loop
Radio Guidance System (RGS) which employs an
explicit guidance law similar to that used during
the Mercury-Atlas program. Figures 1 and 2
show the characteristics of this portion of the
trajectory. Injection conditions are supplied by
a velocity cutoff signal which is activated through
the guidance system at the required attitude and
altitude.
Performance
The performance capability of the Gemini
Launch Vehicle is shown as a function of altitude
and velocity in Fig. 3. For the mission objectives
just described, the vehicle is capable of launch-
ing a payload weight greater than the combined
weight of the Gemini Spacecraft with the adapter.
Fundamentally, the injection altitude chosen
for the launch vehicle is governed by the design
premise that minimum modifications will be
made to the basic Titan II structure. Such
parameters as aerodynamic heating, first =
stage dynamic pressure, staging dynamic pres-
sure and minimum elevation angle required
for guidance were considered in determining
this injection aRltude {Fig. 4). A concession
was made to the flight loads criteria in that
the wind environment used for the Gemini
Launch Vehicle is reduced in comparison to
that normally used on the SM68B vehicles.
Explicitly, Avidyne winds are used in this de-
sign application as representative of the en-
vir0nment experienced at the Atlantic Mis-
sile Range. Dynamic pressure in the first-
stage regime is in excess of that used in
SM68B vehicle design. Aerodynamic heating
limits, which are derived from SM68B per-
formance, and the minimum angle required
for guidance provide the constraints which
limit the injection altitude to approximately
87 nautical miles.
Description of Changes From Titan II
As has been mentioned, the Gemini Launch
Vehicle is a version of the Titan II. The differ-
ences between the two vehicles can be categorized
into three classes:
(1) Changes needed to physically adapt the
launch vehicle for the spacecraft.
(2) Changes required to accomplish the mis-
sion of accurately injecting a spacecraft
into an 87-nautical mile orbit with
enough overspeed to achieve a 161-nau-
tical mile apogee.
(3) Changes or additions made because
men are part of the payload.
In Class 1, the diameter of the top of the ve-
hicle has been increased to 10 feet. No other
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basic changes are required (Fig. 5) because the 
weight of the spacecraft is less  than the maximum 
warhead weight carried by Titan II, and the t ra -  
jectory flown will nst impose loads which exceed 
those for  which the ICBM was designed. 
While some refinements were required, the 
environment and criteria used for the structural 
design of the Gemini Launch Vehicle a re  essen- 
tially those of Titan II. Figure 6 shows four 
major trajectory parameters which directly affect 
the vehicle structural design. Dynamic pres-
sure (q) and axial acceleration are essential to
loads calculations, while structural heating is de-
pendent upon the altitude-velocity relationship.
The flight path shown in Fig. 6 is one of the
numerous trajectories studied in defining the
Gemini Launch Vehicle performance require-
merits. This trajectory is based upon nominal
conditions for a 7400-pound payload injected at
an orbital altitude of 87 nautical miles at perigee.
All load and structural heating calculations
were obtained by using the atmospheric proper-
ties given by the 1959 ARDC model atmosphere
(NASA Technical Note D595). Figure 7 presents
the ground and flight wind profiles used in the
loads calculations; as shown, both ground and
flight winds represent I% risk values. The ground
wind profile, which is used for prelaunch and
launch loads development, is based upon climatic
data for Patrick Air Force Base as interpreted
by Geophysical Research Directorate, Harrison
Field, Bedford, Massachusetts. The first two-
thirds of the wind profile is applied as a steady
wind condition, while the final one-third is applied
as a gust. The flight winds used are those de-
veloped by Avidyne for the winter months at Cape
Canaveral. A 1-cosine, 20-fps0 true gust is added
to the Avidyne profiles at any given altitude. In
the example shown, the predominant wind is from
the west.
Figure 8 shows the net effect for the critical
air load condition. The Gemini Spacecraft-Launch
Vehicle configuration creates a different air load
distribution at the forward end, and this different
distribution causes higher internal structural
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stresses. These differences are offset by using a
lower engine gimbal angle, 3.5 degrees instead of
5 degrees (Fig. 9). The substitution is justified
because the control requirements for the most
dispersed cases are less than 3 degrees.
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Class 2 modifications (Fig, 10) deal with those
changes needed to increase the payload capability
for the required orbit. The following steps were
taken to meet these new requirements.
(1) Delete the Titan H Inertial Guidance Sys-
tem. The Gemini Launch Vehicle sys-
tem uses a Three-Axis Reference Sys-
tem during the first stage flight and a
Radio Guidance System during the second
stage. Since the GE Mod IH-F is used
as a tracking and impact predictor for
Titan II, a complete Radio Guidance Sys-
tem (GE Mod HI-G) was developed by
simply adding a decoder.
(2) Use MISTRAM only on the Gemini Launch
Vehicle. Titan II uses both MISTRAM
and Azusa tracking equipment.
(3) Remove the Titan II retro and vernier
rockets.
(4) Change the instrumentation system from
a 0- to 40-millivoR system, to a 0- to
5-vol_ system.
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Figures 11 and 12 show the modifications made 
to the guidance and instrumentation trusses in or- 
der to adopt the Titan for the Gemini mission. 
Table 1 shows three Stage I1 configurations 
which have the necessary equipment to perform 
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"ormallzed b remove N-11 warhead zdaptor. 
(21 RwiredGemini engine speclliwtion weight 
I31 Stated with vernier s y M  weight includsd W pounds). 
141 Reflects ducting in  equipment compartment for air conditioning 
151 lncludar AC-Sparkplug llCSl teiemetryprkqes. 
(61 Used to rotate the burned out Stqe  2 out of the llighl path of the payload 
after separation. 
(71 Based on propellant loading statement issued 20 February 1%3. lhm 
values are nominal and include mean OWE. 
(8) Based on cold pmpellant loading statement issued 20 February 1963. 
(Pi inciudsd to normalize mmpariron basis. 
d i l e  the vehicle is on pad. 
(101 All weights include malfunction daectlon and radundarcy pmvisbns. 
TABLE 2 
INCREASED PROPELLANT AN3 PAYLOAD 
Cold pmpelimt m 
Tank volume considentlonr 1260 
Total Loadad 33x1 
NonusMes. transienb and M a  650 
Total stsady-sbte urn 1160 5160 
urn 
iim 
The increase In paybad c@lllty with rxu l k  cm be stltsd x lollarc: 
W 
lib1 
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73 
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a Gemini mission. The tabulation indicates that 
a payload increase of 1168 pounds was realized 
because of the differences between the Titan 11 
research and development ship No. 11, which 
served a s  the base for the Gemini Launch Vehicle, 
and the Gemini configuration finally chosen. In 
addition, it is shown that there is a payload differ- 
ential of 264 pounds between a stripped Titan 11 
with inertial guidance and the final Gemini Launch 
Vehicle configuration. 
Table 2 shows the increased payload and pro- 
pellant that the Gemini Launch Vehicle is capable 
of handling. There are four reasons why the 
Gemini Launch Vehicle can carry this additional 
propellant: (1) calibrated tanks with nominal 
rather than minimum values are used; (2) The area 
between the prevalves and thrust chamber vakre 
can be used for propellant storage; (3) a more 
accurate loading system is provided; and (4) lower 
propellant temperatums are maintained. 
shows how the additional 5160 pounds of propellant 
which can be loaded on the Gemini is distributed. 
The preceding tabulation explains the payload 
Table 2 
gains realized to date; it does not include addi- 
tional gains that could be effected through: 
(1) Reducing ullage requirement and load- 
ing more propellant. 
\ 
FIG. 11. EQUIPMENT TRUSS NO. 1 (GUIDANCU 
(2) Using selective injectors to bring 
about I gains. 
SP 
(3) Using chambers selected to optimize 
burning mixture ratios. 
(4) Devising additional means of reducing 
weight. 
The changes in instrumentation hardware, some 
of which resulted in the weight savings just dis- 
cussed, a re  summarized in Table 3 and a re  sche- 
matically indicated in Fig. 13. The summary of 
all the Class 2 changes is shown in Fig. 10. 
Class 3 modifications (Fig. 15) deal with those 
changes which have been introduced to ensure the 
safety of the two astronauts who w i l l  be aboard 
the spacecraft. The Man-Rating and Pilot Safety 
Program which was developed to do the job in- 
volves many considerations. These a re  summa- 
rized in Fig. 14. 
Gemini changes related to hardware a re  con- 
sidered under the category of system design. Spe- 
cifically, the major considerations made in this 
category can be delineated as: 
(1) Addition of a Malfunction Detection 
System (MDS). 
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(2) Addition of those features required to
produce flight control system redun-
dancy.
(3) Addition of time delays in the flight
termination system.
(4) Addition of redundancy provisions in
the electrical circuits of the flight
sequencing system.
Malfunction Detection S_stem (MDS)
Effective implementation of a Man-Rating and
Pilot Safety Program, like the one shown in Fig.
14, will ensure a launch vehicle which will per-
form more reliably. Even though the goal is per-
fection, realistically, there is always some pos-
sibility of hardware failures. In order to mini-
mize losses due to this possibility to the lowest
attainable level, a highly sensitive Malfunction
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(1) Time histories of launch vehicle action 
following anomalies. 
(2) The time in which anomalies may be 
sensed and displayed. 
(3)  The extent to which "cues" other than 
hardware sensing w i l l  be available and 
useful. 
(4) The relative complexity and reliability 
of an automatic versus a manual sys- 
tem. 
(5) The astronaut's role: the role which 
is desired and the contribution which 
can be made. 
SAFE-ARM SWflMEs 
(6)  The mission requirements effect. 
(7) The escape system concept. 
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Detection System has been incorporated in the 
Gemini Launch Vehicle. This system (Fig. 16) 
provides information on those parameters which 
most significantly affect the safety of the astro- 
nauts and the success of the mission. 
The fundamental question which must be an- 
swered in developing a Malfunction Detection Sys- 
tern is, "How wi l l  the sensed information be used?! 
Stated simply, the question can be reduced to de- 
termining the degree of automatic action which 
should result; that is, should the sensed informa- 
tion cause automatic ejection or should the infor- 
mation be displayed to the pilots who would then 
decide what to do. Before a valid decision can be 
made, the following factors must be considered. 
FIG. I& MALFUNCTION DaECTlON SYSTEM 
Although these factors can be evaluated inde- 
pendently, many of them are  necessarily inter- 
related. For  example, in the case of the Gemini 
Launch Vehicle, Items 4, 5. 6 and 7 were inter- 
meshed and basic decisions in these areas indi- 
cated a need for a manual rather than an auto- 
matic abort system. However, this meant that 
Items 1, 2 and 3 had to be evaluated in order to 
determine whether a safe manual system could 
be developed. 
tem could be provided, the Gemini Malfunction 
Once it was proven that such a sys- 
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Detection System w a s  implemented to provide in- 
formation to the astronauts who must ultimately 
decide what action is to be taken. 
Project Gemini's design philosophy is sum- 
marized effectively in a February 1963 article 
in "Astronautics and Aerospace Engineering'' 
by Chamberlain and Meyer. An analysis of a few 
quotes from this article enables one to under- 
stand the need for a manual abort system. 
The Atlas is so instrumented that it will  au- 
tomatically abort the Mercury Spacecraft if 
any one of a number of malfunctions is 
sensed in the launch vehicle. The automa- 
tic abort modes in Mercury a r e  very com- 
plicated and have caused the loss of complete 
spacecraft in the early development un- 
manned flights. In each instance, had a 
man been on board, he could have manually 
salvaged the situation. 
In Gemini, a launch vehicle malfunction ac- 
tivates lights and gages on the instrument 
panel and the astronauts exercise judgment 
a s  to the seriousness of the situation and the 
best procedure to follow during any special 
circumstances. With this sort of system, 
more than one cue can be used to verify an 
abort situation. Simulations reveal that in 
many cases, much reliance is placed on the 
audio-kinesthetic cues for this purpose. 
These cues a r e  not only very reliable, but 
instill confidence in the pilots in the validity 
of the systems when they are  checked by 
this means. 
A further quote from this article shows that 
one of six primary objectives of the program is: 
To perfect method0 for returning and land- 
ing the spacecraft on a small preselected 
landsite. This objective involves re-entry 
control and a pstraglider for spacecraft re -  
covery. 
a substitute for a reserve parachute. but 
also provide an escape mode both early in 
flight and on landing. 
The ejection seats not only provide 
This latter quote is offered to indicate some 
of the background that led to the choice of ejec- 
tion seats as one of the escape modes. Their 
use and speed of reaction is one of the factors 
that was considered in deciding whether a manual 
abort system was feasible. 
The factors just evaluated cover Items 4, 5, 
6 and 7 of the characteristics which had to be 
considered in evaluating the desirability of a 
manual versus an automatic abort system. Logi- 
cally, the next step in such an evaluation was to 
examine all possible malfunctions in order to 
determine the more critical malfunction times. 
The first step in such an analysis w a s  to de- 
termine the frequency of failures by systems. 
Primarily, this information w a s  gathered by re- 
viewing Atlas, Titan I and Titan I1 histories. 
During these analyses, the following information 
w a s  particularly sought: 
(1) Probability of occurrence 
(2) Mode of failure. 
(3) Time until critical limits a r e  exceeded. 
From these studies, a summary of what might be 
expected on the Gemini Launch Vehicle was pre- 
pared; the summary indicated the probabilities of 
malfunction by systems (Fig. 17). Each system 
w a s  then considered independently, and the con- 
sequences of a failure at different times during 
the flight on better than 1000 analog simulations 
of this kind were made for the Gemini Launch 
Vehicle Program. Typical results of these studies 
a r e  shown in Figs. 18, 19, 20 and 21. From these 
data, the time required to reach a critical limit 
I 
FIG. 17. WKGANIZATIOF~ OF MALFUNCTION rKOWtm 
35 BROKEN AUTOGENOUS LINE
.... 2-SQ IN. ULLAGELEAK
25 GAS PRES URE 1 MINIMUM
"_l /'---MINIMUM \
V_15"_:,-."_ / S_TRUCTURAL".
"":,'.'-- "_/.. THRESHOLD "\
-..'-_ - - .......
_ "_*_". CRITICAL NPSH-_,_'_n ",'_". THRESHOLD ___-_
'1. ..... --'¢".- "_-. ..... ..- -"
AMBIENT ---_'_"'. ""-. .... -"" °'"
PRESSURE "-.
20 40 60 80 180 120 140
TIME FROM 87 FS 1 (SEC)
FIG. I& STAGE I FUELTANK MDS REQUIREMENTS
_ 10
_g.
_r_. z
o
FIG. 20.
/_SiNGLE ENGINE OUT]
_" PAD IMPACT
BOI'H ENGINES OUTJ
I
,-LOSS O1: IHRUST OF SINGLE_j
r /ENGINE (VB'IICLE LIMIT) |
/ t t,. VEHICLE
/ I | BREAKUPI
_. /_/ELOSS OF THRUST OF BOTH/ I
,_J'_/:/:/:/:/:/_"ENGINES (WH C_ L M T J I
'I II-_STAGE I BURNOUT I
I STAGE II BURNOUT-----.I
I I
_"__'--BURST OF PROP_MIT
FROM RIB,_ IMPACT I
MALFUNCTION OCCURRENCE (SEC)
INADVERTI_IT THRUST TERMINATION
was determined. For example, Fig. 20 shows
that if an engine failure occurs at approximately
70 seconds, the vehicle would break up in approx-
imately three seconds. With a manual abort
system, the sensing, indication, reaction and es-
cape actions would all have to occur within three
seconds. The results of these analyses indicated
that it is possible to react to all failures in a
timely manner, with the exception of engine hard-
over cases which will be discussed under Flight
Control System Redundancy. From these analy-
ses, it was determined that the following param-
eters must be monitored while the Gemini Launch
Vehicle is in flight:
(1) Four tank pressures (structural limit
or minimum NPSH).
(2)
(3)
Engine chamber pressure switches set
at 68% of rated thrust for Stage I and
65% for Stage II; this is equivalent to
550 psia ±30 psi for both stages.
Vehicle attitude rates.
Stage I Stage II
(deg/sec) (de_/sec)
Pitch +3.5, -4 10
Yaw ±3.5 10
Roll 20 20
(4) Staging signal: the light goes on at
staging signal (87 FS 2, 91 FS 1) and
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FIG. 21. VIOLENT CONTROL MALFUNCTION
goes off at separation approximately
87 FS 2 + 0.6 second.
The tank pressure sensors provide analog sig-
nals to the spacecraft indicators. Redundant sen-
sors, which are connected in independent, parallel
circuits individually routed to the spacecraft, are
supplied for each tank. All other sensors are bi-
level. They are _lso redundant for each param-
eter, but, in this case, they are connected in se-
ries. Consequently, the contact of both sensors
in the redundant pair must be closed before a
signal is initiated (Fig. 22).
In addition to the parameters measured in
flight, sensors have been added in those lines
which contain the propellant tank pressurants.
These sensors measure whether gas for the tank
pressurization is being generated to a value which
will be high enough to pressurize the tanks. The
values sensed are:
Values Stage I Stage II
Fuel 50 + 4 psi None
Oxygen 385 ± 25 psia None
If the sensed values are not high enough, an en-
gine l_ill is initiated prior to liftoff.
In addition to the flight considerations, there are
ground abort conditions which also had to be evaluated.
These conditions are shown in Fig. 23.
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The figure shows that the Gemini recovery area 
is being cleared and leveled for recovery of the two 
Gemini pilots in the event of a pad abort. The legs 
of this triangular-shaped area are each 1000 feet 
long and the angle between them is 54 degrees. 
All elevated obstacles are being removed; even pad 
illumination lights will  be installed flush in the 
ground. The highlighted area (dashed line) will be 
deluged with water in the case of booster explosion. 
In present Gemini capsule design, the pilot's seats 
are angled 9 degrees above horizontal and 12 de- 
grees apart. The ejection motor on each seat will 
develop 2500 pounds of thrust and burn for 1 sec- 
ond; pilot should be clear of capsule 0.4 second 
after motor ignition. Barostats will  activate seat- 
mounted chutes 3 seconds later when the pilots are 
about 300 feet above the ground. Pilots will  have 
a maximum 5.5 seconds in which to initiate es- 
cape procedures after notification from .Range 
Safety Officer of his intention to destroy a mal- 
functioning booster. 
FIG. 23. COMPLEX 19 RECOVERY AREA 
69 
One switch will eject both seats. Ejection seats
will be the primary escape mode up to 70_ O00 feet.
After that, pilots will escape by firing the space-
craft's solid propellant retrorockets, each develop-
ing 2500 pounds, and separating the capsule from
the launch vehicle. Pilots would then fly their cap-
sule back to earth by paraglider. NASA, Martin
and McDonnell are studying ways of pilot escape
from the launch stand before the erector is dropped,
preparatory to engine ignition. These include a
cherrypicker, high-speed elevator, cork-screw
type slide and lifelines.
The times at which the remaining escape modes
(use of spacecraft retrorockets or longitudinal
spacecraft maneuver rockets) would be used are
shown in Fig. 24.
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Flight Control System Redundancy
As previously indicated, analyses were made
for a number of postulated malfunctions to de-
termine how much time would elapse from the
instant when a malfunction was sensed until
critical limits were exceeded. These times were
then examined to define whether there was suffi-
cient time for pilot warning and reaction. The
engine hard-over condition, that is a failure in
the flight control system or hydraulics which
causes or allows one or two engines of Stage I
to drift hard-over, was examined carefully.
Figure 21 shows the time histories accumulated
during these analyses. As seen, it takes approx-
imately 1.25 seconds to reach vehicle destruction
if both engines drift to hard-over in pitch and one
second or less to reach a physiological limit
should a single engine drift hard-over and cause
a yaw-roll buildup.
In order to determine whether there would
be enough time for astronaut reaction for this
and other cases, NASA decided to conduct a se-
ries of experiments. These were conducted at
Chance Vought in a simulator where the mal-
functions were simulated and response time
measured. In all cases, except those for en-
gines hard-over, there was sufficient time for
positive astronaut reaction. In no case was the
time for engine hard-over met.
These experiments showed that a manual
abort system was desirable, possible and prac-
tical, except in the case of engine hard-over.
The question then remained as to whether an
automatic abort be provided for this con-
dition or whether some compensatory method
could be devised. A number of studies were
made to determine the effect of various degrees
of redundancy. These studies showed that the
most effective system was one in which redun-
dancy was provided from guidance through the
flight control systems and to the hydraulics of
Stage I (Fig. 25). With this system, the proba-
bility of an engine hard-over failure is reduced
appreciably, while the probability of mission
success is increased significantly from 90 to
93.6% (Fig. 26}.
The effect of sensing and switchover to
maintainthe vehicle within structural limits is
shown in Fig. 27. Switchover to the secondary
system can be effected by four methods:
(1) Command from the pilot.
(2) Detection of vehicle overrate by MDS
rate sensors.
(3) Loss of Stage I primary hydraulic sys-
tem pressure.
(4) Positioning of Stage I hydraulic actu-
ator.
Pilot command is initiated manually by the
astronaut. These decisions are based on the
pilot's interpretation of the spacecraft display,
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plus information which he receives from the
ground station. The MDS overrate sensors will
automatically initiate a signal when the vehicle's
motion exceeds a predetermined safe limit. In
addition, the hydraulic pressure switch auto-
matically initiates switchover when the pressure
on the primary side is reduced to a preset value.
Each of these methods produces a signal
which simultaneously energizes the hydraulic
switchover valve solenoids in the Stage I hy-
draulic system, and a relay which switches the
Stage II hydraulic system input signals from
the primary to the secondary autopilot.
Flight Termination System
Except for the following differences, the
STAGE It
Gemini I.aunch Vehicle flight termination and
destruct system (Fig. 28) is the same as that
used on Titan II (N-I).
(I)
(2)
Crew safety switches have been added
between the airborne 28-v d-c power
supply and the destruct switches.
The 28-v d-c power is isolated from
the destruct switches until after flight
termination system shutdown command
has been initiated.
(3) Time delay relays have been added to
prevent the flight termination system
from giving a destruct command until
5.5 seconds have elapsed after the
shutdown command has been initiated.
(4) Time delay relays (5.5 seconds) have
been added to the Stage I automatic
destruct system; consequently, the
system reacts only if there is an in-
advertent separation of Stage I from
Stage II during the boost phase.
(5) Stage I is shut down and destroyed if
it inadvertently separates from Stage
II during boost phase.
(6) The Stage I inadvertent separation de-
struct system is made safe at approxi-
mately 10 seconds prior to normal
separation by independent signals trans-
mitted from both the Three-Axis Refer-
ence System and 140-second timers.
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Stated simply, these changes, which have been
made to protect the men aboard, provide infor-
mation with respect to Range Safety Officer. action
and adequate time for independent astronaut ac-
tion. A summary showing the specific escape
mode against thee time of flight during which the
mode would be employed is shown in Fig. 18.
As further evidence of the planning which has
been done to provide maximum crew safety,
Fig. 29 shows a summary view of tracking, flight
termination and destruct systems actions which
occur prior to and after launch.
Figure 30 shows the flight termination sequence
times during the various modes of escape. Vehicle
destruct is accomplished by another independent
action and a signal from the Range Safety Officer
following destruct enable.
Gemini Electrical Sequencing
The addition of the Malfunction Detection Sys-
tem and the modifications made to the guidance
system brought about a number of changes in the
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electrical sequencing circuits. SLnce the basic
design had to be changed, it was decided that the
maximum degree of redundancy, within the con-
text of the cl_ange, should be provided. Essen-
tially, redundancy was achieved through the cir-
cuit wiring design without adding any new com-
ponents. Table 5 compares the Gemini and Titan
II electrical sequencing systems.
The controlling electrical sequencing system
for the Gemini Launch Vehicle consists of the
motor driven switch and relay logic which is re-
quired to perform such functions as:
(1) Shut down the Stage I engine.
(2) Fire Stages I and II separation nuts.
(3) Start Stage II engine.
(4) Command autopilot gain changes.
T-300 LroO 220 180 140 T-100
MIN
The system is shown in detail in Fig. 31.
LIFTOFF
60 20 T-0 T+oA T+149. 5 T+l/9. 5
m
m
CHECKS (T-3O0 TO_ SEC)mCHECKS(T-_]OT _ SEOm
m m
CHECKED PERIODICALLY DURING
COUNTDOWN BY RANGE PERSONNEL
• mm
li •
m •
m
|
|
INERT
I
m (s IMULATED)
LIFTOFF
T+332
T-15 SEC
T-_ SEC
T-]O
T-3O SEC
T-6 MEN B
MODE I SEAT ESCAPE JMODE II S/C ESCAPE JMODE III SPACECRAFT ESCAPE
i I
T-35 SEC LOCK ON I|IFT-3S SEC LOCK ON
i I
I
I , I
T+30
NT+42
mT+12
• T+12
T+4
_l+2
:T+40
LIVE INIIIMOR
I
I
$
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I)
i
I
i
I
FTOFF+139. S
T+S.5 L$FTOFF+13,9. S --
NOTE:
• PROCESSED 1NROUGH DATA SELECTOR BEFORE ENTERING & GE BURROUGHS DATA TO DE TIED IN wITH ADSP
?090 IMPACT PREDICTOR COMPUTER
(AUTOMATIC DATA SELECT PROGRAM)
FiG. 29. RANGE SAFETY SYSTEM SEQUENCE
72
J MODEI SEATESCAPE
RSO
COMMAND
CONTROL
SHUTDOWN
ACTUAL EQUIPMENT
SHUTDOWN TIME
,/SECSEC!SECI SEC!
'ESC^PE/
RESPONSE /
5 5; ]
CREW DESTRUC
RECEIVES ENABLE
SIGNAL
ACTUAL
SHUTDOWN
2 T Z 12.5-SEC
SECI SECIESCAPE
RETRO
5.5 FIRE
I MODEII SIC ESCAPE MODEIli SPACECRAFTESCAPEI
RSO RSO
COMMAND COMMAND
CONTROL 'CONTROL
SHUTDOWN ISHUTDOWN
ACTUAL ESCAPE
SHUTDOWN TIMESECtOSELJ
2 7A'LOFGO "SICOA'*ISEC
5.5 1SEC SEC
REW OESTRUCTCREW OESffiUCT
RECEIVES ENABLE RECEIVES ENABLE
SIGNAL SIGNAL
FIG. 30. FLIGHTTERMINATIONSEQUENCE
Titan II Electrical Sequencin_
While the Gemini and Titan sequencing systems
are similar, Gemini has four additional provisions:
(l)
(2)
(3)
The system is redundant,
There is a Stage I fuel shutdown sensor.
There are 40- or 140-second time delay
relays. In Titan these arming functions
are performed by the Digital Control
Unit.
(4) There are two staging switches.
The APS staging switch performs the same
function in both the Titan and Gemini Launch
Vehicle. However, the Gemini can also call on
Spacecriffenablefor
launchvehicleengine
shutdown
StageI fuel endoxiOizef
shul_m sensin9
Stagingarming
s_ing.
SUI_ If lowIll,ill shuhlmm
St_jeII guidanceshuMown
a backup IGS switch to perform the APS func-
tions. The degree of redundancy which has been
added is summarized in Fig. 31.
The sequencing system, which is fully redun-
dant, is set into operation when the launch vehi-
cle actually lifts off from the pad. The follow-
ing operations occur simultaneously during lift-
off:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
The 40-second time dela_y relays
(Nos. 1 and 2) start timing.
The Three-Axis Reference System
starts timing.
The 140-second time delay relay starts
timing.
The spacecraft receives a liftoff sig-
nal.
After 40 seconds has elapsed, the 40-second
time delay relays are timed out, and the astronaut
then has the capability to command a launch vehi-
cle shutdown by operating the appropriate shut _
down switches. After 140 seconds has elapsed,
the stage separation circuitry is armed by both
the Three-Axis Reference System and the 140-
second time delay relay.
Normally, at approximately 150 seconds, the
oxidizer will be depleted and a low stage I engine
chamber pressure will result. The Thrust Cham-
ber Pressure Switches will sense this condition,
supply a ground to the staging circuitry, and
staging will occur. If the fuel is depleted before
the oxidizer, the Stage I fuel shutdown sensors
will supply a ground and initiate staging.
FLIGHTSEQUENCINGFUNCTIONS
GeminiLaunchVehkle Implementation
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TABLE5
FLIGHTSEQUENCEDIFFERENCES:TITAN I I ANDGLV
Time from Litlolf
(SOc_ Source of Function
Function
9_Sl Stage I ignition
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Pitch program start Step NO. l
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Stage II shutdown is normally accomplished
by the Radio Guidance System command; how-
ever. it may also be accomplished by:
(1) IGS.
(2) Astronaut.
(3) APS and IPS command control re-
ceivers.
(4) Stage II propellant shutdown sensors.
Relay No. 2 switches shutdown capability from the
Radio Guidance to Inertial Guidance System.
Aerospace Ground Equipment
The selection of Aerospace Ground Equipment
(AGE) for the Gemini program was influenced by
two major considerations: first, that the launch
vehicle is a modified Titan II; second, that Launch
Complex 19 will be available for this program.
A comparison of equipment selected shows
that, of the 208 AGE control points, 143 involve
Titan equipment used "as is," while 33 involve
Titan-modified. and 32 Gemini-peculiar control
points.
The Ground Instrumentation System at the
launch complex consists of a telemetry ground
station, data recording equipment, signal con-
ditioning, power mo/titor and control, time code
distribution, control console and associated
patching and cabling equipment. This system
provides a flexible recording system which can
be used to acquire data through umbLtical or
transmitted telemetry links.
Checkout and Launch Control
Essentially, the checkout philosophy ualls
for a decentralized approach; i.e., for each ma-
jor airborne system, an equivalent piece of
equipment is provided to check the appropriate
airborne system. Hence, the flight control sys-
tem test set will check out the airborne flight
control system, etc. The relationship of the
various airborne systems and the checkout
equipment is illustrated in Fig. 32.
Each checkout set can operate on its equiva-
lent airborne system virtually independently of
the other equipment. However, during the count-
down phase, all operations performed by the
checkout equipment must be coordinated by the
launch control equipment. The checkout equip-
ment will be predominantly manual, with auto-
matic operation being used only during critical
events or time periods. This philosophy assumes
more importance than ever now that redundant
flight controls and hydraulic components have
been incorporated into the Gemini Launch Vehi-
cle.
Launch control is obtained with the Master
Operations Control System and other related
equipment, including closed circuit tdlevision
and a community time display board. The Mas-
ter Operations Control System will provide time
coordination during checkout of the launch vehi-
cle and remote control of facilities such as the
process water system and erector. It will also
display the state of readiness of the entire com-
plex as the various time checkpoints are reached.
Lastly, through use of hold-fire and kilt signals,
it will provide the means of permitting or inhib-
iting launch at the predetermined T-O point.
Activation
Martin has been assigned the responsibility
of integrating activation of Launch Complex 19
and the Gemini Launch Vehicle Support Area at
AMR (Figs. 33 and 34).
Complex 19 is currently being activated, with
all activities progressing as scheduled. Prima-
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FIG. 77. AGE INSTALLATION--COMPLEX 19
rily, the activation effort on the complex consists
of modifying the following existing facilities:
(1) Blockhouse: the air-conditioning sys-
tem only.
(2) Ready building: double size to house
NASA, McDonnell and Martin person-
nel.
(3) Launch deck: external north end.
(4) Complete vehicle erector: add white
room, second elevator and spacecraft
hoist system.
(5) Second-stage erector: relocate work
platforms.
(6) Complete vehicle umbilical tower: ex-
tend height to accommodate two addi-
tional booms for spacecraft.
(7) Second-stage umbilical tower: relocate
existing booms.
(8) Flume: enlarge and rearrange to per-
mit quick runoff "of expended fluids.
(9) LOX holding area: use as storage area
for spacecraft AGE service carts.
(10) Roads and grading: modify south road
to accommodate fuel and oxidizer hold-
ing areas.
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FIG. M. CAPE CANAVERAL COMPLEX LAYOUT
In addition to the facilities to be modified, the
following new facilities will be added to Complex
19: a new road, located at the north end running
north and south for delivery of the LH 2 to the
spacecraft on the pad; an oxidizer holding area;
a fuel holding area; a decontamination building
and an air-conditioning facility for spacecraft
servicing. No new facilities are required in the
launch vehicle support area, except for a com-
ponents cleaning facility which is expected to be
provided by AFMTC for all contractors to use.
The design of modified and new facilities has
been accomplished by Rader and Associates of
Miami, Florida, in accordance with Martin's
"Facilities Design Criteria,*' ER 12053. The
construction of these facilities will be accom-
plished by the Army Corps of Engineers. New
and modified AGE will be installed in all those
facilities previously mentioned. All AGE to be
installed and checked out is listed in the plan.
Martin will install all AGE on Complex 19 and
in the Launch Vehicle Support Area. Each agency
providing such equipment for installation will
check out and maintain its own equipment through-
out the program.
The activation phase of the program will be
considered complete immediately after the first
satisfactory flight-readiness demonstration.
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